From the Elite Forces of the Third Reich Website

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The battle of Kursk was monumental for numerous reasons but will almost always be remembered for being the largest clash of armor, certainly during W.W.II and would not be rivaled until the Arab-Israeli wars of the 1960's and 1970's. The vast area around the city of Kursk presented itself as a target with a salient being formed in the Russian line of defense. Hitler needed a victory that would regain the initiative in the east and declared that Operation Zitadelle as it was known" would shine like a beacon to the world" and would avenge the crushing defeat at Stalingrad earlier in the year, but even he had misgivings about the whole affair. The brilliant armor strategist Heinz Guderian once asked Hitler "Was it really necessary to attack Kursk and indeed in the East that year at all. Do you think anyone even knows where Kursk is?" to which Hitler agreed with him saying, "I know. The thought of it turns my stomach."

But Colonel-General Kurt Zeitzler insisted that the offensive go ahead and he became the main avocet of the offensive. The facts however were plain to see as a large salient had been created with the capture of Kharkov by the Germans a few months previous in March and was logically the next sector in which to start an offensive.

    The salient was positioned just south of Orel with Maloarkangelsk at the northern base, at the center of the salient was the city of Kursk and at its southern base was Belgorod. The Russians without a doubt knew of the impending German offensive with the massive build up of German armor and troops around the salient and through their "Lucy" spy network in Germany and also from ULTRA codes intercepted by the British and passed on to Stalin. It was obvious anyway that this would be the next German point of attack as the "bulge" presented too tempting a target for the Germans to ignore and the Russians saw this as a catalyst to start their own summer offensive.

    Stalin was intent on attacking the Germans in a pre-emptive strike but General Zhukov insisted on letting the Germans attack first and wearing themselves down on the defenses he had planned. These defenses were of a scale never seen before for a battle and the Russians immediately put the military and 300,000 of the local civilian population to work laying a massive array of tank traps,  minefields, anti-tank guns and dug in tanks and other defensive positions in anticipation of the German attack. The minefields were specially designed to channel the armored formations into dug in antitank defenses and it was hoped that the Germans would burn themselves out trying to break through the defenses

    Armour and troop concentrations were also built up by both sides with the Russians amassing 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,400 aircraft. The Germans also assembled a formidable fighting force which was slightly smaller with 900,000 men 2,700 tanks 2,000 aircraft. As well as the three premier Waffen SS divisions taking part.    

The original date for the offensive to take place was the 4th May 1943 but Hitler wanted to wait for the new Panther and Elefant tanks to be ready and a series of postponements followed. June 12th was the next scheduled date but the collapse of the African front in Tunisia also delayed the start of the offensive for a further three weeks until July. On the night of the 3rd  July German Army sappers cleared and taped paths through some of the minefields, an extremely dangerous business as the ground was full of metal and the readings on detectors went into a frenzy. This meant that the mines had to be prodded with a bayonet and lifted out and made safe by hand. Testimony to the expertise of the Großdeutschland engineers was the fact that ten men of the 2nd Engineer Company on the night of the 3rd July lifted and made safe a total of  2,700 mines which worked out at a rate of a mine a minute by each man! On the same night the Red Army captured a sapper of the 6th Infantry Division-Private Fermello after a skirmish, who informed the Soviets of the start time of the offensive which was to be at 3am on 5th July. In the Belgorod sector a Slovene sapper deserted and told the Soviets of the date and start time of the offensive confirming what they already knew.

    At 14.45 hrs on the 4th July Stukas belonging to the five Ju 87D Gruppen of Luftflotte 4 bombed an area around Butovo two miles long and 500 yards deep. The attack lasted ten minutes and as the dive bombers turned for home German artillery and Nebelwerfers opened up on the Red Army positions. Hoth's III Panzer Korps advanced on the Soviet positions around Savidovka, Alekseyevka and Luchanino. At the same time at Butovo the Soviet 199th Guards Rifle Regiment were attacked by 3rd Battalion Panzer Grenadier Regiment in torrential rain and the high ground around Butovo was taken by 11th Panzer Division. To the west of Butovo the going proved tougher for the 3rd Panzer Division who met stiff Soviet resistance and did not secure their objectives until midnight.

    Meanwhile II SS Panzer Korps were launching preliminary attacks to secure observation posts for the next days fighting and again were met with stiff resistance until assault troops equipped with flame-throwers cleared the bunkers and outposts. At 22.30 hrs the Soviets hit back with a fierce artillery bombardment which, aided by the torrential rain, slowed the German advance. At this time Georgi Zhukov had been briefed on the information about the start of the offensive gained by the German prisoners and decided to launch a pre-emptive artillery bombardment on the German positions.

    Ten minutes before the Offensive was to begin and the German artillery barrage was to open up, the Soviets launched their own bombardment with 600 guns, mortars and Katyusha rocket launchers belong to Central Front which lasted for thirty minutes. The German response was slow at first but by 4.45am had grown in intensity. In fact the weight of shells fired during this bombardment was heavier than that fired during the whole of the Polish and French campaigns. A second Russian battery opened up but was ineffectual in disrupting German assembly areas and after the war Zhukov, analyzing the battle admitted that both fronts had opened up too early as German armor and infantry were still under cover. However some of General Model's troops were caught in the open and could not start their attack until 90 minutes after their scheduled start time. The Großdeutschland division had made the best progress advancing towards its objective of Oboyan forcing the Russian 3rd Mechanized Corps back to the River Pena.

    II SS Panzer Korps under the command of Paul Hausser progressed quite well using a tactic known as the "Panzerkiel" which was basically spearheaded by the heavy Tiger I tanks followed up by Panther, MK IV and MK III tanks. By the 6th July they had penetrated some twenty miles but had come under increasingly harsh resistance. Losses were high too with the Leibstandarte for example losing on the first day of action, 97 men killed and 522 men wounded.

    II SS Panzer Korps continued on towards Prokhorovka with the 3rd SS Totenkopf leading the advance and smashing all resistance to the west of the town. Their flank however was unprotected as Kempfs 6th,7th and 19th Panzer Divisions (III Panzer Korps) were stalled by 7th Guards Army after crossing the River Donets. The 5th Guards Tank Army were situated to the east of the town of Prokhorovka and were preparing a counter attack of their own when II SS Panzer Korps arrived and an intense struggle ensued  with elements of the 5th Guards Army being deployed to halt the advance. During which the Soviets managed to halt the SS-but only just. This sent alarm bells ringing in the Soviet camp and they knew that if III Panzer Korps broke out, the balance of armor would tip in the Germans favor. They decided to deploy the rest of the 5th Guards Tank Army to destroy the SS armored divisions.

    On the 12th July the Luftwaffe and artillery units bombed Soviet positions and the SS Divisions formed up into their "Panzerkiel" formations and were astonished to see masses of Soviet armor advancing towards them. What followed was to go down history as one of the largest tank engagements ever mounted. The Germans contrary to popular belief did not deploy masses of Tiger I tanks  which made up a small percentage of the the total number of tanks with the main force consisting of up-gunned MK III and MK IV tanks. The conflict was fought at very close range with main armament and armor bearing little importance as a hit at almost point blank range would mean certain death. The Luftwaffe and Soviet air forces fought dogfights in the sky above but could play no part in the battle below as friend and foe were indiscernible through the dust and billowing black smoke pouring out from destroyed tanks. The battle raged on all day  and by evening as the last shots were being fired the two sides disengaged. German losses amounted to over 300 tanks lost with the Soviets losing a similar number.

    German losses, not just from this engagement but from the start of the offensive and losses in men and machine due to the extensive defensive preparations the Russians had made before the offensive had started and the immensely deep minefields which had proven themselves extremely effective had taken a seriously high toll. This along with the extensive Russian artillery and Katyusha fire had also taken a heavy toll on the floundering German divisions.

    The new tanks had turned out a very disappointing show with most of the Mk V Panthers breaking down on the first day due to problems with the complex electrical cooling systems (from a total of 200 only forty were in running order at the end of the first day). The Elefant tanks although a formidable machine with their 88mm gun had also proved a disappointment with Russian infantry simply attacking the 73 ton monsters with satchel charges and Molotov cocktails when they were separated from the infantry with relative ease due to the absence of a hull machine gun as a secondary defenses.

    Although German losses were quite high Russian losses were higher with the 6th Guards Army (which had borne the brunt of the assault) suffering very high losses and by the 11th July the battle hung in the balance. Things did not look promising for the Germans for two reasons.

    The defeat of the Afrika Korps meant that the invasion of Sicily was imminent  and units that were badly needed on the eastern front would have to be transferred to the western front to bolster the defenses in Italy. The second reason and more alarming to the German forces at Kursk was the arrival of the 5th Guards Army in the salient.

      When the Allies landed in Sicily Hitler called von Kluge and Manstein to his headquarters and declared that he was calling Operation Zitadelle off. von Manstein was furious and argued that one final effort and the battle could be won. Hitler would have none of it particularly as the Soviets had launched a new counter offensive in the Orel sector. It was decided the Leibstandarte would be transferred to Italy and Sepp Dietrich would personally escort the deposed Mussolini's mistress Clara Pettachi to him after Skorzeny's rescue of the Duce from Gran Sasso.  Sepp Dietrich  was duly disgusted!

    On the 15th July, Rokossovsky's Central Front struck at the Orel bulge and by 5th August Orel was liberated. The Germans withdrew to the partly prepared Hagen line at the base of the salient. To the south of Kursk the Russians re-grouped and by 3rd August another offensive opened up and Belgorod was liberated on the same day as Orel. The attack forced a 40-mile gap in Army Group South between 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf. On the 11th August the last battle of Kharkov began and by 20th August the Germans were forced to withdraw. The Germans from then on would be fighting defensive battles all the way back to the frontiers of the Reich and into the Reich itself.

    Zitadelle had proved a costly gamble which, if one analyses the battle, had a very slim chance of success and one from which the Germans would never fully recover their losses.

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